A ‘SECURITY COUNCIL’ TO DEAL WITH NON-MILITARY GLOBAL THREATS

THE GLOBAL RESILIENCE COUNCIL REVISITED

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Background
In the period April to July 2020 FOGGS convened a series of online brainstorming sessions on the UN system’s performance in response to the COVID-19 global emergency. The sessions were held under the Chatham House Rule and included country representatives to the United Nations, other country and regional organization officials, current and former international civil servants, academic experts and civil society organizers. Based on ideas exchanged during the brainstorming sessions, FOGGS developed two UN75+25 Proposals and presented them on the occasion of the UN’s 75th anniversary in September 2020. One referred to a “Global Resilience Council” and the other to “A New Narrative of Hope and Resilience”. The “zero draft” indication was adopted for the two proposals to make clear that they were not final but open to discussion for shaping their intricate details. Both proposals were presented and discussed at an online event that FOGGS organized in September 2020. Specifically for the Global Resilience Council (GRC), there was another paper produced in November 2020, while in February 2021 FOGGS convened a brainstorming session entitled “A ‘Global Resilience Council’: Why and if Yes, How?” In view of the great interest demonstrated by global governance experts and practitioners, as well as civil society activists about the GRC proposal, FOGGS is now issuing this new paper with a view to taking the rationale for and possible implementation of a GRC forward. The paper is accompanied by a set of slides that present in a visual manner the main points of the GRC proposal – see separate document under the UN2100 Initiative of FOGGS. These two documents, as well as the previous ones on the subject, have been produced by a FOGGS team led by Richard Kinley, President of FOGGS, Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director of FOGGS, and Harris Gleckman, Director, Benchmark Environmental Consulting.

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PART I
The need for a ‘Security Council’ to deal with non-military global threats: a contribution toward the recovery of multilateralism

PART II
A first practical step towards a ‘Security Council’ to deal with non-military global threats
PART I

The Need for a “Security Council”
to deal with Non-Military Global Threats:
A Contribution Towards the Recovery of Multilateralism

Identifying the need

The world lacks an equivalent body to the UN Security Council with the authority to lead large-scale collective responses to non-military crises that are – and will be – significantly impacting humanity and planetary stability.

Global non-military threats and risks come in multiple forms and shapes. Some threats come to international attention because of abrupt events; other threats evolve from long-term, systemic factors; still other threats are relatively latent and are brought to international attention thanks to findings from a range of academic disciplines. But what has changed in recent decades is that the some of these threats have become multidimensional mega-crises well beyond the capacity – or potential capacity -- of the multilateral organizations.

Part of the reason that today’s crises cannot be addressed is that the post-World War II global governance system, reflected in the structure of the UN system, is organized on the basis of specialization of agencies by sector / government ministry. National agricultural authorities meet at the FAO; executives of national health ministries go to the WHO; the heads of central banks gather at the annual meetings of the Bretton Woods Institutions in Washington, D.C.; labour officials engage in multilateral affairs at the ILO; and heads of programs dealing with women’s equality attend the Commission on the Status of Women and UN Women. Even the UN General Assembly is in its own way specialized. The primary participants in the General Assembly are from national ministries of foreign affairs.

On the financing side, the IMF sits separately from the WTO, which sits separately from the Basel monetary bodies, which sit separately from the World Bank and regional development banks and all of these organizations pride themselves on having their intergovernmental leadership seat separately from the UN system and other public policy and program institutions. The net result is that each specialized organization and its specialized intergovernmental body has developed an autonomous identity, a separate budgeting process, and a restricted link to one part of its member state authorities. Over the years since the end of WWII, when a new topic is identified as requiring international attention, the drive was to replicate the existing system style and create an organization for that task. This global institutional proliferation and fragmentation clearly does not help form a holistic response to the multi-dimensional and interconnected crises of today.

The operational failings of the UN system as a whole have led to widespread frustration with multilateralism. We see it clearly that the COVID mega-crisis is well beyond the capacity and terms of reference of even the best-intentioned WHO-led response. This is not because WHO lacks expertise in medical matters or in public health matters. It is because any effective response to the current pandemic has to incorporate changes impacting – and demanding changes from – multiple sectors of the global economy, multiple government ministries and agencies, and multiple intergovernmental bodies. It is simply not possible to tackle the pandemic and its social and economic repercussions by actions of a single UN system body. Nor is it possible to contain a pandemic with relatively weak national departments of health acting in
isolation from other government departments or their national banking authorities. Nor can epidemiologists or any other single academic discipline have the tools or capacity to reach across professional lines to bring together all the likely causes or downstream consequences of COVID. Nor should we expect the global pharmaceutical industry or any industrial segment to re-orient other transnational corporations or the economy at large towards addressing the consequences of COVID. Such is the reality of many of today’s – and tomorrow’s – interconnected global crises that cannot be addressed by unconnected institutions.

The reality now, though, is that to address effectively, say, the sharply rising rate of hunger, there needs to be a high-level intergovernmental engagement not only of Rome-based agricultural organizations but also UNCTAD to address internal and external market conditions and port and custom arrangements, UNEP to draw on its expertise on soil management and non-point sources of pollution, WHO to get the best balance between caloric and protein requirements, and the WTO to manage the distortion of trade from agricultural subsidies. To address the multifaceted response to climate change requires not only Governments to meet at the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, but also Governments to address biodiversity and desertification and align to that their participation in governing the IMF, WTO, UNEP, FAO, UN Women, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and IMO.

Most of today’s mega-threats have causes that are intrinsically tied to the way globalization is organized and, for effective resolution, require actions in many different parts of global governance and the global economy. TNCs can opt to have their greenhouse gas emissions shifted between geographic areas. The legal structure of international businesses means that headquarters can adopt a public policy position that is not legally obligatory on affiliates or on supply chain companies. Firms in highly sensitive areas, such as the pharmaceutical industry, have sufficient market power to undermine the human rights of millions of people unless those people can pay for their products. Any global efforts to re-dress the rapidly increasing rate of global economic and social inequity require the multilateral system to engage directly with the dynamics of the global economic system. These complex and multidimensional realities require a new institutional approach, one that can, like national governments, intervene to re-direct the relevant markets.

The current state of play

Unfortunately, over the past decades, the use of voluntary commitments, even in the face of increasingly high-risk global governance issues, has become the norm in international relations. So much so that obligatory measures almost need to be re-discovered as a tool in global decision-making. Global volunteerism to implement major economic, social, gender, and development actions depends for its effectiveness on shared ‘political’ will and the willingness to use that shared will, when it exists, to discipline countries and other actors whose actions cause or aggravate the underlying threat or problem.

As unpleasant as it may be for Governments and other global actors, it is necessary to recognize that every mega-crisis has countries, private actors, and others who benefit from that crisis. Just as the UN Security Council has to recognize that some belligerents in armed conflict may not accept voluntary calls to a ceasefire, so too a “Security Council” for non-military crises has to be equipped with a range of economic and social sanctions to raise the cost of continuing adverse activities by those non-responsive to calls for voluntary actions. Some form of obligatory intervention is now necessary if collective action by the international community to address mega-crises is to have any meaning.

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1 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and World Food Program (WFP).
Responding effectively to all the multidimensional, non-military threats requires a clear re-mapping of the inter-connectedness of risks, systemic interactions, and national and global governance actors.

Attempts to bring such threats under the purview of the current Security Council stumble on the Council’s lack of Charter mandate, legitimacy and expertise in dealing with matters beyond considering their impact on traditional military-centred security in its deliberations and decision-making. Other deliberative bodies like the UN General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Human Rights Council or the High-level Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF) provide platforms for diplomatic exchanges and declaratory outcomes but have no operational capacity and certainly cannot enforce their decisions. These and analogous intergovernmental and expert bodies in other parts of the UN system provide platforms for diplomatic exchanges and declaratory policy statements on some of the major global challenges of today but have very limited operational authority.

In the UN Charter, adopted in 1945, the body assigned to deal with non-military global challenges, namely the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is given limited powers of persuasion. It “may make or initiate studies and reports” (Art. 62.1) and “may make recommendations” to the General Assembly on international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters, as well as on human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Art. 62.1, 62.2), “may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly” (Art. 62.3), and finally “may call… international conferences” (Art. 62.4). As such the ECOSOC is legally not able to function as an analogous body to the Security Council which has clear capacities, beyond peacekeeping related activities, to take decisions legally binding on all States.

The High-level Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF) may only issue “a ministerial declaration” when it meets under the authority of the ECOSOC and “a concise negotiated political declaration” when it meets under the authority of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, the Peacebuilding Commission, the functional commissions under ECOSOC, and similar bodies in the UN system also have very limited operational authority, let alone equivalent obligatory authority to that of the Security Council. They cannot formally instruct all UN system entities to work together in a cross-organisational manner, let alone define a common programmatic response for non-state actors.

The highest level of interagency coordination today is an administrative body, the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). The CEB brings together the heads of UN system entities to share experience on administrative matters and to discuss how to undertake program coordination. The CEB however excludes the heads of regional intergovernmental bodies, the heads of the Basel financial organizations, and heads of leading secretariats supporting Conferences of Parties. On program coordination they are also in effect restricted by policy and program decisions made by their respective governing bodies consisting of government representatives. What is really needed but does not exist today is a body capable of bringing together specialised multilateral agencies and agreements, the international financial institutions and government ministries to address mega-crises in a cross organizational manner. A new Security Council type body for non-military threats has to fashion a way for an effective multilateral response.

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3 While the High-level Political Forum and the Peacebuilding Commission are currently undergoing internal reviews, neither of these reviews anticipate a significant expansion of their terms of reference nor the addition of obligatory authority.
A way forward

Recognising that the UN system should have a central role in dealing with all this, several proposals have been put forward in the past for the creation of a new body like an Economic Security Council, a Sustainable Development Council or a Human Security Council. There have also been proposals to redefine the mandate of the Trusteeship Council to give it trusteeship over the Earth system. None of those ideas, though, have come to fruition. The development of a new body, the scope of its mandate and the politics around its establishment would need to take into account the reasons these earlier proposals did not advance.

After WWII the international community re-configured global governance to prevent the scourge of war. Today’s global crises are challenging the world community again to re-configure global governance to prevent human mega-tragedies and planetary instability. As with the post WWII reorganization that learned from the weaknesses of the prior global governance arrangements in the League of Nations, the new reconfiguration needs to examine the institutional weaknesses exposed by the crises of today and use that re-examination to launch initiatives that can bring about a new system of global governance. Of course, as with the post WWII construction of a new global order, there will be powerful actors opposed to those efforts; some, as they benefit from the current failures of global governance, some because they are risk averse and some simply because of institutional inertia.

What we are looking for here would be a body central to multilateralism, through which the political response to major multi-dimensional crises could move up from the level of individual specialized agencies to the global community at large, leading to concerted action across sectoral, economic sectors, and ministerial agendas. A new body should be able to address these multidimensional mega-crisis in a dramatically new fashion one that is based on a ‘whole of government’, ‘whole of multilateralism’, and a ‘whole of globalization’ approach. The establishment of such a body with the ultimate responsibility of ensuring human resilience and planetary stability at global level could also help introduce a new generation of multilateral institutional arrangements fit for the UN75+25 period. In short, the world needs a body that can exert coherent influence across UN system agencies, governments, and the economy if it is to effectively address complex, intertwined global problems. Designing such a body is indeed daunting, yet it needs to be done.
PART II

A First Practical Step towards a ‘Security Council’ to deal with Non-Military Global Threats

Introduction of the concept – Foundation for a new body

To initiate thinking and action on a better global response to contemporary multidimensional mega-crisises, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) is proposing that the international community create an analogue to the Security Council to address large scale non-military threats such as complex environmental, economic, social, health and gender-related threats. Such a council could take on responsibilities similar to those given to the existing Security Council, of course adapted to the nature of the threats. The new council could, based on Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter, “investigate any [non-military] dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute [or to significant moral failures]”; “recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjusting such disputes [or situations] or the terms of settlements”; and ‘could call on Members [and non-state actors] to apply economic [and political] sanctions and other measures…’.

A “Security Council” for non-military threats would be an appropriate addition to the international governance architecture. We have come to call the body “Global Resilience Council” or GRC, because the primary aim of responding to challenges is ensuring the capacity of societies and individuals to withstand the shocks and “build back better” in the face of adversity. This paper presents a proposal on how to move forward with operationalizing the GRC concept. It is important to note here that this institutional proposal evolved in concert with FOGGS’ Narrative of Hope proposal that would provide a conceptual and normative framework for individual and collective action across a wide range of global realities and in the direction of a more inclusive and fair globalization.

Essential elements of a GRC

To be effective, a Global Resilience Council would need to meet a number of operational standards, including:

(a) to have, like its namesake, the authority and effective means to change the behaviour of state and non-state actors that cause, are about to cause and/or perpetuate a mega-crisis;

(b) to be able to draw on scientific input, like that prepared by International Panel on Climate Change, to delineate the key interconnected pressures created by the mega-crisis and the knowledge-based actions appropriate to respond to such a crisis;

(c) to follow systematically the development of key social, economic, environmental, gender and governance indicators related to the state of major global threats and provide early warning and action, as necessary to prevent such threats from actually turning into mega-crisis;

(d) to be sufficiently agile to deal with threats ranging from abruptly occurring events to chronic systemic challenges;

(e) to have the capacity to prompt an ‘all-of-multilateralism’, ‘all-of-government’, and ‘all-of-globalization’ response to complex mega-crisis;

(f) to engage multiple constituencies now recognized as powerful actors in global governance while maintaining the centrality of a state-based and accountable multilateral system; and

(g) to require governments and the multiple new global actors to envisage a number of new, creative working methods to currently normalized operational practices.
Any proposal for such a “Security Council” for non-military threats would constitute a significant shift in global governance and would need to take into serious consideration the geo-political realities among major state actors; the enthusiasm for volunteerism in the social, economic, and environmental sectors; the evolution of multistakeholder governance as a partial replacement for multilateralism; the concentration of power exerted by transnational corporations in sectors directly relevant to significant contemporary crises; lessons still being learnt from the inadequate multilateral response to the COVID-19 crisis; and the upsurge in nationalist approaches to inherently global problems.

Given these current realities, the temperature may not be ripe for any new major multilateral body. The decades-long inconclusive process of Security Council reform shows where more ambitious approaches may lead, in this case nowhere.

Possible first steps

In this line of thought it may make sense to establish an interim body where actions can be taken and key international actors can discover the benefits of a dedicated platform to organize an effective global response to large scale non-military threats. There are precedents in history, where a modest start eventually led to something big. For example, the initial European Coal and Steel Community gradually led to the establishment of the European Union; the early parliament-based Common Assembly, whose members were delegated by national parliaments, evolved into a directly elected European Parliament. These examples show that small steps may catalyse real change, as the participants in an ‘interim platform’ and the wider world realize the political benefits of a more authoritative and legally self-standing organization.

To start gaining operational experience with a body designed to address multidimensional global crises, the international community could move first by ensuring an all-of-multilateralism response. This could be achieved through a common platform for inter-organizational deliberations between UN system bodies and other inter-governmental organizations on any matters that one of these entities would wish to discuss. It would also start exploring how multiple advisory assemblies could help focus attention on issues that are gaps in the intergovernmental arrangement. Its limited but quite challenging goal would be to create the dynamics for effective all-of-multilateralism responses to mega-crises by ending the intergovernmental fragmentation of the international system on all non-military matters. If achieved, this would be a big correction on its own.

This interim body, which FOGGS proposes could be called a ‘Intergovernmental organizations Leadership Council (ILC)’, would have four operational goals:

1. To address global crises that are recognized to go beyond the scope or capacity of any single existing multilateral institution, thus strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of the multilateral system as a whole;
2. To correct the coherence gap between the organizations at the core UN system and those of the financing, trade, and monetary systems and the regional and sub-regional intergovernmental institutions;
3. To allow for the development of joint operational capacities in implementation of the common decisions, thus establishing in practice a whole-of-multilateralism response to multi-dimensional mega-global crises; and
4. To create a context to experiment with new working methods, which can move the inter-agency and intergovernmental system forward.
How to create such a platform

The United Nations system has tried various means to overcome the fragmentation of the post WW II structure. To coordinate the administration of their separate organizations, the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) is there to provide the heads of organizations an opportunity to discuss mutual management concerns and undertake joint policy initiatives under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General. Its predecessor the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) was actually created in 1946. The missing element is that the existing system does not have any mechanism to facilitate intergovernmental coordination, which is particularly problematic when faced with a mega-crisis with diverse causes and consequences. As things stand at the moment intergovernmental bodies do not even have a standard practice for asking that an item be placed on the agenda of another intergovernmental body, let alone requesting that other intergovernmental bodies take a certain action. The ILC could serve as a neutral platform for representatives of intergovernmental bodies to meet and to design joint programs drawing on their specialist expertise and political insights of their different intergovernmental constituencies.

This is no small task. Over the decades the international community has established a wide variety of intergovernmental bodies. To overcome fragmentation, the ILC would need to welcome the participation of all the different forms of intergovernmental bodies.4 If one is going to address multi-dimensional crises and cross-organizational matters, one needs to have a platform where all the crucial intergovernmental actors can meet and develop common programs and strategies and feel that they jointly ‘own’ the governing system.

This interim body could be initiated by two relatively easy procedural routes. It could be established as a joint subsidiary body of the existing intergovernmental bodies or it could be put in place by an invitation from the President of the General Assembly to the Presidents/Chairs of other intergovernmental bodies with the express objective to work together to address specific interconnected mega-crisis.

If it were established by the former route, it would be seen as being politically ‘owned’ by a wide range of intergovernmental bodies. The joint body itself would have the authority to create high level task forces that would bring together those parts of the intergovernmental system that are specifically identified as relevant to lead the response to a particular mega-crisis. Precedents exist for such an arrangement. The establishment of subsidiary bodies by existing intergovernmental organs, like the UN General Assembly, the FAO Council or the Conference of the Parties to an environmental convention, can be done normally within months once the negotiations have been concluded, as no ratification process is required. Following decisions made at the 2005 World Summit, the Peacebuilding Commission was established later that same year, as a joint subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, with ECOSOC also involved in the election of its members. After the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012, the High-level Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF) was established in 2013, as a subsidiary body of both the General Assembly and ECOSOC.

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4 The categories of intergovernmental bodies that could potentially be engaged in the ILC include (a) UN Charter principal organs (e.g. General Assembly, ECOSOC), as well as associated Commissions and Boards (e.g. Commission on Women, UNDP Board); (b) UN system governing bodies (e.g. World Health Assembly) and their Commissions and Boards (e.g. FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources); (c) the World Bank Group, the IMF, the Basel financial institutions and regional development banks; (d) the Conferences of Parties to UN registered conventions (e.g. the UNFCCC COP, the Chemicals Conventions COPs); and (e) regional intergovernmental bodies (e.g. African Union, ASEAN).
Each individual governing body need only to adopt a resolution that (a) conveys their desire to join a formal intergovernmental body with other intergovernmental members to work together to address multi-dimensional crises; (b) formally authorizes the establishment of such a joint subsidiary body; (c) commits themselves to responding in a timely manner to requested actions by the ILC; (d) agrees to provide appropriate staff and financial support for the operations and program interventions of the ILC; and (e) designates one or more Ambassadorial level members to represent it at the joint subsidiary body. One of the new working methods would be that the Ambassador(s) would have a dual role; she/he would represent her/his Government and the intergovernmental body of the relevant organization. The representative(s) would speak on behalf of the body of origin and the representatives of all the various bodies together should constitute a body broadly balanced in terms of geographical provenance and gender.

If it were established in response to an invitation from the President of the General Assembly to her/his counterparts in other intergovernmental bodies, then the President could invite just those intergovernmental bodies that had a potentially direct role in contributing to the solution of a given mega-crisis. In this manner there could be at any one time a number of self-standing ILCs, each involving a different configuration of organizations and each focusing on a specific global mega-crisis. The invitation to join a ILC could also specify the number of representative Ambassadors for each participating organization. As with the jointly created subsidiary body option, the process should be straight forward. Each participating intergovernmental body would authorize its President/Chair to accept the invitation and to agree to share a proportion of the budget and staff costs for ILC support. The intergovernmental plenary body or its executive board would provide guidance on the types of policy/program initiatives that would be most relevant to the specific mega-crisis and the best modalities to work with their cousin intergovernmental bodies in terms of operationalizing a response. These internal sector-specific consultations would also aide in engaging a wider range of national ministries in addressing the identified global mega-crisis.

**Bringing in non-state actors**

As multidimensional mega-crises inherently involve multiple components of the global order and thus very diverse communities of actors, the interim arrangement would institutionalize advisory assemblies in order to engage each of these communities in identifying causes and solutions to a given mega-crisis. Each advisory assembly would be expected to define the respective constituency’s response to each specific mega-crisis, advise the ILC in its deliberations, and see to it that its members do their part in implementing the ILC decisions for effectively dealing with the crisis. Each advisory assembly would also be expected to evaluate the views of the other advisory assemblies and dialogue with them on causes, impacts and solutions. This

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5 It should be recognized that most UN system specialized agencies, the Bretton Wood Institutions and regional intergovernmental bodies have spent decades avoiding being seen as a junior international organization to the UN General Assembly. As such it may be difficult for these organizations to accept an invitation from the President of the General Assembly to their President/Chair, as it might diplomatically imply a secondary and non-independent status. At the same time, the General Assembly is the most appropriate body to regularly convene the world’s Heads of State or Government to build a unifying international foundation for an “all-of-government”, “all-of-multilateralism”, “all-of-globalization” and “all-of-society” response.

6 The initial assemblies could include (a) a science / knowledge-based assembly (e.g. IPPC-like science bodies), depending on the issue at hand each time; (b) a religious leaders and moral philosophers assembly to show a new appreciation of ethics as a driving force in crisis response; (d) an assembly for business leaders who have a working commitment to the sustainable development goals and human rights; (e) an assembly for the labour / trade union and professional associations; (f) an assembly for indigenous peoples modelled on the existing UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples; (g) a gathering point for civil society organizations and social movements; (h) an open-door assembly for under-represented and affected communities (i.e. migrants and people with disabilities); (i) a parliamentary assembly consisting of representatives of national and regional parliaments; and (j) an assembly of local, sub-national authorities.
interactive structure breaks with the traditional pattern for intergovernmental bodies just ‘receiving’ input or group statements from non-state organizations from separate communities, while it maintains the state-centric character in its core working methods.

**ILC activation and decision-making**

The primary route for formally opening a ILC action would be the submission of a crisis statement from an intergovernmental member. This crisis statement would be expected to reflect the type of the threat involved and the unique characteristics of that threat. It would also identify the steps that the petitioning organization has already taken to address the crisis and what they perceive is needed to be done that is beyond their organizational terms of reference or capacity. A secondary route for placing a mega-crisis on the agenda of the ILC would be a resolution from two or more of the advisory assemblies that a crisis is slipping between the gaps of responsibility and attention of the current intergovernmental system. These two agenda setting procedures depart from the existing practice that only a government or a group of governments can table a resolution with an intergovernmental body. For the ILC, items are elevated to the global crisis response system by a decision of an intergovernmental body or by a combination of two non-state assemblies.

The interim body would have sanction authority limited to its ability to call upon governments and other organizations to exercise their sanctioning authority. For example, rather than being able to order a freeze on assets of individuals or corporations, a power that the current Security Council has and an eventual GRC would have, the interim ILC would be restricted to proposing to governments and international financial institutions that a decision to freeze the assets of the designated individuals or corporations. With time and deft handling such a call for voluntary action by authorities currently capable of imposing sanctions would garner strength, through the authoritative exposure to the public of the adverse activities of the designated individuals or corporations and the accumulating legitimacy of the ILC.

The ILC could also innovate other social and economic tools to enhance the solution to mega-crisis. Examples of such tools could include: (a) detailed public requests for supplemental information from governments, actors in relevant economic sectors, and other institutional actors; (b) the authorization for the external relations departments of the relevant intergovernmental organizations to work with media and social media organizations to develop and disseminate fact-based information material on the causes and potential solutions to the mega-crisis; and (c) the establishment of public lists of non-complying countries or companies, products, or technologies to influence the decisions by citizens, investors and others.

On an annual basis, the ILC would invite heads of state/government to review the work of the ILC in organizing an all-of-multilateralism response forum. This would be a mutual review of actions taken, as the heads of state/government would also be asked to inform the international community of the steps taken by their government to address the mega-crisis/es in question each time.

In this manner, the interim Global Leadership Council would seek to ensure an all-of-multilateralism response to multidimensional mega-crisis and to make its contribution to the revitalization of multilateralism by having a UN led body guide the direction of multiple international constituencies in the identification of causes and solutions to a given global non-military threat.
Epilogue

Over the coming months, there are a number of potential opportunities for the consideration of new institutional arrangements for multilateralism, among which the UN Secretary-General’s forthcoming report to the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly (“Our Common Agenda: Responding to Current and Future Challenges”) and its potential follow-up.

FOGGS will continue to develop its interim Intergovernmental organizations Leadership Council proposal towards the eventual establishment of a Global Resilience Council / a “Security Council” for non-military threats, keeping in mind the ideas and feedback received on this and related papers. We look forward to having you with us in this effort.

UN2100 Initiative

Innovative and practical ideas towards a modern, more effective, ethical and people-centered United Nations.

For more on this FOGGS initiative see here